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Absract
Some $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{a}_{U^{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}}}$ for the Paoeto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\eta$ offfie $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ in an economy with clubs
are derived Also, the $\mathrm{p}$r$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}w\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ allocabons are deffied and they are shown to $\mathrm{k}$ Pareto
$\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$. The usual definibon of $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\infty \mathrm{b}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\Re \mathrm{M}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ for economies only wiffi private goods
is extended for an economy with clubs, and it is proved ffiat any allocation under the $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}ffi\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$
$\Re \mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\iota \mathrm{m}$ for the economy is Pareto opbmum
1. Inffoduction
Some conmodibes are $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ and jointly consmned by pple. Groups of pople who are
sharing $\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{d}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{e}$ cffied ”$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{s}^{\uparrow \mathrm{f}}$ , or consumpbon $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\triangleright \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{p}$ anangements.
Commodities consumed separately by a single $\varphi \mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ are purely private $\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{d}\mathrm{s}$, whereas
commodibes consumd by all the people in the economy are $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{u}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ public goods. $\cdot$ Thus,
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\alpha \mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ consumed by clubs are $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{d}\mathrm{s}$ ktween the purely private $\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{d}$ and ffie
purely public good
In ffiis paper, we consider an economy with clubs and derive $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{y}$ condibons for Pareto
$\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ in the economy. Also, we define price-supprted allocations and show ffiat
they are Pare.to $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathfrak{U}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ and $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{s}\Phi$ tk Paoeto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}^{\dot{\mathfrak{g}}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ conditions. $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\infty \mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r},$ $\mathrm{w}$ define a
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\infty\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ equihbrium and prove that any $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ under ffie comffibve $\mathrm{e}\dot{\varphi}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ for the
economy is Pareto opbmum. Our definition is a sffaight extension of the usffi comffibbve
$\Re\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ for economies only wiffi private goods.
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In his famous fflffl J. $\mathrm{M}$ Buchanan (1965) obtain4 as Pareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ condibons, the
$\Re \mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ condibons for an individtffi. Y-K. Ng (1973) derived a more $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}ffi\mathrm{r}$ opumahty
condition directly fiom ffie definibon ofPareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\Psi$. E. Berglas (1976) derivd a condibon
for social $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\eta$. E. Helrlan and A L. $\mathrm{H}4$]$\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}$ (1977) $\mu \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}e\mathrm{d}$ out $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\sigma\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{y}$ a $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\dot{0}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$
ktwaen $\mathrm{B}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}^{1}\mathrm{s}$ and $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{s}$ andyses, and showed an $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ condibon for club size. Also, A
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}ffi\dot{\theta}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\Re \mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\iota \mathrm{m}$ was defined by D. Foley (1967) and D. $\mathrm{K}$ Richter (1974) for oeonomies
wiffi public $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{s}_{\vee}$, and by S. Scotchmer and $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{B}$ Wooders (1987) for economies wiffi clubs.
2. Model
We consider a simple mdel ofan economy in which there are two $\mathrm{b}$ds ofcommodibea One
of them is a private good and $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ by each $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{e}}$ ffirson ${\rm Re}$ other is a good $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ and
consumd in a club. The club is a goup of $\pi \mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ who share ffie $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{M}$ in consumpbon. We
assume ffiat ffiere is only one club inffie economy.
Let us denote a quanby offfie good used for the club by ’$||x’,$ wfrich may $\mathrm{k}$ interpreted as the
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ of the club. The numkr of the memkrs, $p\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}_{\Psi}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mu \mathrm{b}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ in the club, is denotd by
$t1\mathrm{I}n’$ . We assume ffiat pple do not caoe about who are members of ffie club, but only akut ffie
number of its memkrs. Therefore, the club is specified by $f\dot{fl\mathrm{r}}(x,n)$ .
We assume that $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}\iota \mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}r\mathrm{e}’\uparrow \mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{t}}$’ and denooe the set ofall ffie persons in ffie economy by
$A=[0,1]$ . The ffiity $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of each ffirson $a\in A$ , when he (or she) is a memkr ofclub $(x, n)$, is
denooed by
$\mathrm{z}\ulcorner U^{a}((x,n),y)$ ,
where$y$ is an amount offfie private good
ne folowing assumptionmeans that $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ prefer a larger and less crowded club.
If a club has no facihboe, $\Psi \mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ can get nothin$\mathrm{g}$ ffom $\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ to ffie club. Therefore, fflople
who do not klong to club $(x, n)$ can $\mathrm{k}$ regarded as members of club $(0, n)$. Thus, by abusing
notabon, we denote the $\mathrm{u}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{h}y\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}ffl\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}a\in A$ who is not a member ofthe club by
$\iota\ulcorner U^{a}((0,n),y)$ .
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Fig. 1: Infflerece Cunres in ckb $(\mathrm{x}, n)$
Fig. 2: ${\rm Re} \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ set for eachperson $\otimes \mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ club $(x_{0},n_{0}))$
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quantity of $\mathrm{p}\dot{\alpha}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\epsilon$ good
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ of club
$\mathrm{F}\dot{\mathrm{g}}3:\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\dot{\mathfrak{g}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{o}s\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}_{\Psi}\mathrm{F}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$
$\mathrm{F}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\lrcorner \mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$, we assumeffie $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\iota \mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}y$ offfie $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{h}\eta$ map and ffie conbnuity ofthe $\mathrm{u}\dot{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ fimcbon of
each $\mathrm{N}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}$.
(1) Map, $(a, (x,n),y)arrow U^{a}((x,n),y)$ , is $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\iota \mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ .
(2) For each $a\in A,$ $U^{a}((x,n),y)$ is $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}$ in $((x,n),y)$.
The producbon set $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$is denoted by a set $\mathrm{Y}$, which is descrikd by a fimction $F$, i.e.,
$\mathrm{Y}=\{(x,y)|x\geqq 0,y\geqq 0,F(x,y)\leqq 0\}$ ,
$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{e}x$ is a quanbty usd for the club and $y$ is a $\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\Psi$ of the private good ffle prduction
$\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ ffonber of $\mathrm{Y}$ is the set ofall the points $(x,y)$ ffiat satisq
$F(x,y)arrow$.
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3. $\mathrm{P}\pi \mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$ OptimrmAllocations
To descnb an alloeahon in the economy, we have to spiqffie facihboe offfie club, its memkrs,
and ffie diffilbuuon offfie private good among people. Let us denote the facihties ofthe club by a
number $k$ and its memkrs by a measurable subaet $M\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}A$ . Then, the club is denoted by $(k, M)$.
Let 2 $(M)\mathrm{k}$ the Leksgue $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\iota\pi \mathrm{e}$ of set $M$. We $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}$ , without loss of $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$, that 2 ($w$ is
ffie nunnkr ofthe memkrs ofthe club.
To denote ffie disfflbuuon of the private $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\infty$ we use a rffi-valud measurable fimction $f$on $A$ ,
whereXa) is an $\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ offfie privaoe good allocatd to $\varphi \mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}a\in A$ . Thus, an allocarion in the
$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}s\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}s,$ $\{(k,M),f\}$ . $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k,M),f\}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\omega \mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{y}$
is said to $\mathrm{k}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ if $(k, \int_{A}fda)\in \mathrm{Y}$
In $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\infty \mathrm{a}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k,M),f\}$ , the ffiity ofmemkr $a\in M$is $U^{a}((k, \lambda(M)),f(a))$ , whereas the $\mathrm{u}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{h}_{\Psi}$
of non-memkr $a\in A\backslash M$ is $U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)),f(a))$ . Let $\chi_{M}\mathrm{k}$ the indicator $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{c}\dot{0}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$of set $M$,
thal is, $\chi_{M}$ is a fimcbon such that $\chi_{M}(a)=1$ for $a\in M$and $\chi_{M}(a)4$ for $a\in A\backslash M$. Then, the uhhty
$\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}ffi\iota \mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}a\in A$ is denotd by $U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))$ .
feaslble allocation $\{(k’,M),f\}$ such that
$U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k’\chi_{M’}(a), \lambda(M’)),f’(a))$
for all $a\in A$ andffie snict inequahty in the above hol&for some $a\in A$ .
In what follows, we conffie ourselves to the case in $\mathrm{w}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ allocabons are in ffie ”$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}^{1\uparrow}$ .
Namely, for any allocabon $\{(k, \mathrm{M},f\}$ , we assume $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota k>0,$ $i(w>0, \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\lambda a)>0$ for all $a\in A$ .
Also, we assrnne that ffinction $F$ and the $\iota \mathrm{N}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ fimctions of pple are all differenhable in the
interior oftheir domains.
The addihon of $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\dot{\mathrm{k}}$rs to the club affects the value of ffie club to any one memkr. The
$\mathrm{p}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{d}$ may $\mathrm{k}$ desigatd a numeIaire $\mathrm{g}\infty \mathrm{A}$ and can $\mathrm{k}$ simply $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\not\in \mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ of as money. The
value ffiat eachmemkr $a\in M$offfie club loses ffom adding amemkr is $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}8\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by
$\mathrm{A}fflS_{yn}^{a}.\cdot=-\frac{\partial U^{a}}{\partial n}\div\frac{\partial U^{a}}{\partial y}$ .
Thus, the total value that ffie memkrs of the club lose for adding an addibond memkr is
$\int_{M}\mathrm{A}fflS_{yn}^{a}da$ , which is $\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{e}$ admission fae, orffie price ofmemkrship offfie club.
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The $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ theorem $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\Re \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{s}$ to one offfie Paoeto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\eta$ condibons assertd by Y.-K
Ng (1973) in an economywith clubs.
Then ffie
fouowing holds:
$U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a)+q)\leqq U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in M$
and
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a)-q)\leqq U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in A\backslash M$.
$\mathrm{E}\mathrm{m}\Phi \mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\varphi \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ that $U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a)+q)>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for some $a\in M$. $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{m}$
there exist $\xi>0$ and $E\subset M$wiffi $\lambda(E)>0$ such that
$U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)-\lambda(E)),f(a)+q-\int_{E}\mathrm{A}aS_{yn}^{a}da-\epsilon)>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$
for all $a\in E$.
oefine $g.Aarrow R_{+}$ by
$g(a)=$ $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}a\in A\backslash M\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}a\in E\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}a\in M\backslash E$
Ken, clearly, $\int_{M}gda=\int_{M}fda$ . Also, ifwe $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}E$so ffiat $\lambda(E)$ is sufficiently small, ffien we
have
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)-\lambda(E)),g(a))>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)-\lambda(E)),f(a)-\mathrm{A}aS_{yn}^{a}\lambda(E))$
$=U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in M\backslash E$.
$\mathrm{B}\dot{\mathrm{u}}s$ shows ffiat $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k, M\backslash E), g\}$ improves $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k, M),J\}$ , whch conffa&cts ffie
Pareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\eta$of $\{(k,M),f\}$ .
On ffie offier hand, $\sup\mu s\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\iota U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a)-q)>U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for some $a\in$
$A\backslash M$. Then, there exist $\xi>0$ and $E\subset A\backslash M$wiffi $\lambda(E)>0$ such that






for $a\in A\backslash (M\cup E)$
Then, clearly, $\int_{4}gda=\int_{A}fda$ . Ako, if we $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty s\mathrm{e}E$ so ffial $\lambda(E)$ is sufficienfly $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$, ffien we
have
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)+\lambda(E)),g(a))>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)+\lambda(E)),f(a)+\mathrm{A}fflS_{J^{n}}^{a}\lambda(E))$
$\neg-U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in M$.
This shows ffiat allocahon $\{(k, M\cup E), g\}$ improves $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{L}’ \mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k, M),f\}$, whch conha&cts ffie
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{a}r\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{\mathbb{R}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{h}^{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\{(k,M),j\}$ . $\blacksquare$
The condition in the above theorem says that any memkr ofthe club wants to have more than $q$
for leaving the club, whereas any non-member offfie club w41 not py more than $q$ for entering the
club. Thoe, no Paoeto improvement can $\mathrm{k}$ made by any conbact between any $\mathrm{m}\alpha \mathrm{n}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{r}$ and any
non-memkr offfie club.
A : staving in the club
Fig. 5: hfflerece curves in $(x, y)$ for a member
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A : $\epsilon i\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\epsilon$ out of $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\epsilon$ rlub
Fig. 6: hdiffcrencc cuuves $(x. y)$ for a non-mcmber
The value that each mmber $a\in M$of the club gains fiom increasing ffie $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}$ offfie club by
one unit is denoted by
$\mathrm{A}fflS_{yx}^{a}:=\frac{\partial U^{a}}{\partial x}\div\frac{\partial U^{a}}{\partial y}$ .
The $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ cost to increase the $\Re \mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ offfie club is denotd by
$MT_{yx}. \cdot=\frac{\partial F}{\partial x}-\cdot$. $\frac{\partial F}{\partial y}$ .
ne $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ theorem is one of ffie Pareto ophmality conditions derived by J. $\mathrm{M}$ Buchanan
(1965) and Y.-K. Ng (1973), which is a generahzabon of the $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$ opbmality $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}o\mathrm{n}$ for
allocabons ofpurely public goods provd by $\mathrm{P}$ A. Samuelson (1954).
Then, we have
$\int_{M}M\mathfrak{B}_{\mu}^{a}da=MT_{y\mathrm{r}}$
$\underline{\mathrm{p}}_{\Phi}\mathrm{g}$. Suppose $\int_{M}MS_{y\mathrm{r}}^{a}da<\mathrm{A}\mathcal{O}\mathfrak{i}T_{yx}$ . Then, there exists $\xi>0$ such that $\int_{\mathit{1}I},\Lambda\alpha S_{\mu}^{a}da+\mathcal{E}<$
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$\mathrm{A}_{i}RT_{J^{\alpha}}$ , and for all sufficiently $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\delta>0$ ,
$(k- \delta, \int_{A}fda+(\int_{M}MS_{\mu}^{a}da+s)\delta)\in \mathrm{Y}$
Define $g\cdot.44arrow R_{+}$ by
$g(a\succ^{-}$ $fora\in A\backslash Mfora\in M$
Then, clearly, $\int_{A}gda=\int_{A}fda+(\int_{M}\mathrm{A}fflS_{y\alpha}^{a}da+s)d$, and ffieoefore $(k- \delta, \int_{A}gda)\in \mathrm{Y}$, which
implies that $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\propto \mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k-\delta,M),g\}$ is feasible. Also, ifwe choose a small $\delta$ , ffien
$U^{a}((k-\delta,\lambda(M)),g(a))>U^{a}((k-\delta,\lambda(M)),f(a)+hfflS_{yn}^{a}\delta)$
$\equiv U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in M$.
This shows that allocabon $\{(k-d, M), g\}$ improves allocabon $\{(k, M),f\}$, which conbadicts the
Pareto ophmahy of $\{(k,M),f\}$ .
In case of $\int_{M}\mathrm{A}fflS_{\mu}^{a}da>\mathrm{A}\mathcal{O}\mathfrak{i}T_{yx},$ $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty s\mathrm{e}\mathcal{E}<0$ and $d<0$ such that $\int_{M}\mathbb{R}S_{\mu}^{a}da+s>$
$\mathrm{A}RT_{j\propto}$ and $(k-d, \int_{A}fda+(\int_{M}\mathbb{R}S_{y\alpha}^{a}da+\xi)d)\in \mathrm{Y}$ Then, we can have the same
conbadiction $\blacksquare$
4. Supporting Prices
The $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{y}$ conditions for Pareto optimality, but not
sufficient $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ . $\mathrm{h}$ what folows, we w41 show a sufficient condition for Pareto optimahty.
We assume that the prioe ofthe private good is unity. Let us denote the price of the $\infty \mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$
$\mathrm{u}s\mathrm{d}$ for the club by$p$.
condibons are $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}$ :
(1) If $\{(k’,M?,f\}$ is an $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$such that
$U^{a}((k\chi_{\mathrm{A}t}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k’\chi_{M},(a),$ $\lambda(M’)),f’(a))$ for all $a\in E$,
ffien we have
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$\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}\lambda(M\cap E)+\int_{E}fda\leqq\frac{pk’}{\lambda(M’)}\lambda(M\cap E)+\int_{E}fda$ .
(2) $pk+ \int_{A}fda\geqq px+_{y}$ for all $(x,y)\in \mathrm{Y}$
The above deffiibon means $\mathrm{U}\mathfrak{N}$ if a feasible alocahon is $S\mathrm{u}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{m}\mathfrak{n}\mathrm{d}$ by a prioe, people are
The $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\check{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ theorem shows $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\iota$ king supportd by a prioe is a sufficient condibon for feasible
allocabons to $\mathrm{k}$ Pareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}^{\dot{\mathfrak{g}}}\mathrm{m}\iota \mathrm{m}$ .
Emof Suppse that a feasible allocabon $\{(k, M),f\}$ supprted by a prioe $p\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{e}$ not Pareto
ophmum. $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$there is a feasible alocahon $\{(k’,M),f\}$ such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota$
$U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k’\chi_{M’}(a), \lambda(M’)),f’(a))$
for all $a\in A$ and ffie $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ ineqffiity holds for some $a\in A$ . Rerefore, by (1) ofDefinibon 4.1, we
can showbt
$pk+ \int_{A}fda<pk’+\int_{A}fda$ ,
which $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}\ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}s(2)\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}4.1$. $\blacksquare$
$\int_{M}MS_{yn}^{a}da=\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}$ and $\Lambda RT_{yx}=p$.
$\mathrm{E}\Omega \mathrm{L}\mathrm{f}$ Let $E\subset M$ and $X(E)>0$ . $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f},f(E)$ is sufficiently small, ffien for each $a\in M$ffiere exists $e$
$(a)>0$ such ffiat
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)-\lambda(E)),f(a)-(\mathbb{R}S_{yn}^{a}-\epsilon(a))\lambda(E))>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$.
Now, let $\{(k’,M),f\}\mathrm{k}$ an $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$such ffiat $k’=k,M=M\backslash _{E}$, and$f(a)=$
Then, $U^{a}((k,\lambda(M’)),f(a))>U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for each $a\in M$. Therefooe, by (1) of
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}4.1$ , we have
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$\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}\lambda(M)+\int_{\mathrm{A}\Gamma}fda\leqq pk+\int_{M’}fda$
$\gamma k+\int_{M},fda+X(E\mathrm{x}-\int_{M}\mathrm{A}aS_{yn}^{a}da+\int_{\mathrm{A}t}\epsilon(a)\ )$ ,
i.e., $\int_{\mathrm{A}l}\mathrm{A}fflS_{J^{n}}^{a}da\leqq\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}+\int_{M}.\epsilon(a)da$ .
For each $a\in M$, when2 ($E$ goes $\hslash 0,$ $\epsilon(a)$ also goes to $0$. $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{u}s$, the akve $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\eta \mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\eta$ implioe ffiat
$\int_{M}\lambda RS_{yn}^{a}da\leqq\frac{pk}{\lambda\langle M)}$ .
$\mathrm{h}$ order to $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ ffie opposioe inequahty, let $E\subset A$ Wand ,$I(E)>0$. If2 $(E)$ is sufficiently small,
then for each $a\in M\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\alpha \mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\Phi s(a)>0$ suchffiat
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)+\lambda(E)),f(a)+(\mathrm{A}aeS_{yn}^{a}+\epsilon(a))\lambda(E))>U^{a}((k_{*}\lambda(M)),f(a))$ .
Now, let {$(k’,M),f?\mathrm{k}$ an allocabon suchffiat $k’=k,M=M\cup E$, and$f(a)=$
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n},$





For each $a\in M$, when ,$l(E)$ goes to $0,$ $s(a)$ also goes to $0$ . Thus, ffie above inequahty implioe ffit
$\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}\leqq\int_{M}\mathrm{A}aS_{yn}^{a}da$ .
Findly, by (2) ofoefinibon 4.1, we can easily showffiat $MRT_{r^{--}}p$. $\blacksquare$
Now we can show ffiat the $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{k}\iota \mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{p}$ fee of the club is $\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)}$ and the demand prioe for the
club is$p$.
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Ken, we have ffie
$l\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\backslash \mathrm{V}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}.\cdot$
(1) $U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)),f(a)+\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)})\leqq U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for al $a\in M$
and
$U^{a}((k, \lambda(M)),f(a)-\frac{pk}{\lambda(M)})\leqq U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in A\backslash M$.
(2) $\int_{M}\mathrm{A}fflS_{y\propto}^{a}da=p$
$\Xi \mathfrak{W}\mathrm{f}$ By $\mathrm{R}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}4.1$ , any $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ allocation $\sup\mu\iota \mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by a prioe is Pareto ophmum, and
ffierefore ffiis theorem $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ follows ffomLemma 4.1, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. $\blacksquare$
We do not know under $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota$ assumptions the converse of Theorem 4.1 holds, ffiat is, if an
allocabon is Pareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\dot{0}\mathrm{m}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{L}$ then it is supprted by a prioe. The $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ , by using prioes,
ofPareto $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}^{\mathfrak{g}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ allocabons in the economy with clubs is an $0\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{n}}$ problem.
5. Compebtive $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$
Let us denote ffie prioe ofthe good usd for the club by$p$ and the prioe $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{p}$ ofthe club
by $q$ .
such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota$ the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ conditions are satisfied:
(1) $U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a)+q)\leqq U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in M$
and
$U^{a}((k,\lambda(M)),f(a)-q)\leqq U^{a}((0,\lambda(M)),f(a))$ for all $a\in A\backslash M$.
(2) $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\{(k’,M),f\}\mathrm{i}s\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}11\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$
$U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k^{\mathfrak{l}}, \lambda(M’)),f’(a))$ for all $a\in M$,
then
$q \lambda(M\cap M’)+\int_{M},fda\leqq pk’+\int_{\mathrm{t}f}fda$ .
(3) $q\mathit{2}(M)-p\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
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(4) $pk+ \int_{A}fda\geqq px+y$ for all $(*y)\in Y$.
$\mathrm{h}$ ffie akve $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\dot{\mathrm{b}}0\iota \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(1)$ moens that each $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}$ is $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{i}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{g}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\Psi \mathrm{l}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ abudget
consffaint $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(2)$ moens that the club cant change its memkrs by mahng koer offers to
new memkrs at the same cost Therefore, condibons (1) and (2) imply ffiat ffie market of
$\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{k}\iota \mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{p}$ is in $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\iota \mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}$. Condihon (3) moens ffiat the market ofmembersiuip is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}f\dot{fl}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$
and ffie club ffls no profits in $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\iota \mathrm{m}$. $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(4)$ means the producers $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\infty \mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ are
In (1) of the above $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}_{l}$ it is $\mathrm{a}s\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{d}$ ffiat each prson decide wheffier he (or she) should
join ffie exishng club, or not Therefore, our $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$of comfflibve $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{l}$ is different ffom
that of S. Scotchmer, S. and M. X WMers (1987), in $\mathrm{w}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\varphi \mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$one club to join among
many ptenbally exisong clubs.
Nowwe can prove ffie basic ffieorem ofwelfare economics for economies with clubs.
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{f}$ Suppose ffiat a $\infty \mathrm{m}\infty \mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ allooehon $\{(k,M),f\}$ were not Pareto ophmum. $\Pi \mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ there is a
feaslble $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\propto \mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\{(k’,M),f\}$ such that
$U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k’\chi_{M},(a),$ $\lambda(M’)),f’(a))$ for all $a\in A$ ,
where ffie $\mathfrak{W}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\Re \mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$holds for some $a\in A$ .
For each $a\in M$, we have
$U^{a}((k\chi_{M}(a), \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((k’, \lambda(M’)),f(a))$ .
Rerefore, by (2) $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}5.1$ , we have
$q \lambda(M\cap M’)+\int_{M}.fda\leqq pk’+\int_{M},fda$ .
For each $a\in M\backslash \mathrm{A}l$, we have
$U^{a}((k, \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((0, \lambda(M’)),f(a))=U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)),f(a))$ ,
which implies, by (1) $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}5.1$, thatf$(a)+q\leqq f(a)$ . $\Pi \mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}$, we have
$q \lambda(\mathrm{m})+\int_{\lambda\kappa 1l}fda\leqq \mathrm{j}_{\mathrm{A}KM}.fda$ .
For each $a\in A\backslash (M\cup M)$ , we have
$U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)),f(a))\leqq U^{a}((0, \lambda(M’)),f(a))=U^{a}((0, \lambda(M)),f(a))$ ,
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$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}s\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota fla)\leqq f(a)$. $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{u}s,$ $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$
$\int_{A\backslash (\mathrm{A}\mathrm{O}M)}.fda\leqq\int_{A\backslash (\mathrm{A}DM)}fda$ .
In one ofthe $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ ffiroe inequahties, the strict $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\Re \mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\eta$ holds. Therefore, by adding them up,
we have
$q \lambda(M)+\int_{A}fda<pk’+\int_{A}fda$ ,
whch, by (3) $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}5.1,$ $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}(4)\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\dot{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}5.1$ . $\blacksquare$
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